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Part VII 
The Legacy and Contributions of 
Beverley McLachlin 

McLachlin’s Law: 
 In All Its Complex Majesty 
Jamie Cameron 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Beverley McLachlin was a member of the Supreme Court of Canada 
for 28 of the Charter’s1 first and most formative 36 years — for 10 years 
as a puisne judge (1989 to 1999) and another 17 as Chief Justice (2000 to 
2017). No other judge has had as distinguished a career on the Court, and 
it will be a long time, if ever, before another jurist has as much impact on 
the Charter. She was an exemplary Chief Justice, one of Canada’s finest, 
and is deeply respected as a jurist. 
The enigma of McLachlin is that her jurisprudence has so neatly defied 
categorization. She handily interleafed liberal and conservative outcomes in 
her decisions, and in her earlier years was styled a hybrid — a pragmatist, 
empathetic libertarian, hard-headed liberal, and a chameleon, not to mention 
an “eclectic” and “somewhat unpredictable” judge.2 Those in search of an 
                                                                                                                        Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going 
On?” (speech delivered at the Lord Cooke Lecture, Wellington, New Zealand, December 1, 2005) 
(explaining that judicial conscience is informed by the law “in all its complex majesty”): 
<https://www.fact.on.ca/judiciary/NewZeal.pdf>, at 25 [hereinafter “McLachlin, ‘Unwritten 
Constitutional Principles’”].  Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I thank my colleagues, Professors 
Benjamin Berger and Sonia Lawrence, for inviting me to participate in the Constitutional Cases 
Conference and contribute this paper to the volume. I also owe great thanks to my Research 
Assistant, Ms. Bailey Fox (J.D. 2019), for her invaluable assistance on the paper. I am also grateful 
for the helpful and supportive comments of the anonymous reviewer, and for further insights from 
my Research Assistant Mr. Matti Thurlin (Joint J.D./Philosophy program). For an early blog version 
of this paper, see J. Cameron, “Dissent and Empathy: Hallmarks of a Complex Judicial Personality” 
(Part II, I-CONnect Symposium on “The Legacy of Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin” (December 6, 
2017), online: <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/12/cameron-on-the-chief-justice/>. 
 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 Sean Fine, “The Most Important Woman in Canada” Saturday Night (December 1995), at 
9 [hereinafter “Fine, ‘The Most Important Woman’”]; B. Wallace, “Stepping Out into the Light: 
New Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin wants a more open Supreme Court of Canada” Maclean’s 
(November 15, 1999), at 32 [hereinafter “Wallace, ‘Stepping Out’”] (articles on file with author).  
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ideological or philosophical thread were stumped, prompting one 
commentator to ask, “[w]here is the articulated vision, from the bully pit, of 
better law in a better society?”3  
Beverley McLachlin did not fit “pre-conceived stereotypes” and her 
“lack of apparent ideology” meant that there was no “easy rallying point 
for critics” or, to be frank, for her admirers.4 If there is no shame in a 
legacy consisting in a head count of landmarks — which in her case 
would be lengthy — quite simply Beverley McLachlin was nobody’s 
champion. She was fundamentally a careful and disciplined judge who 
was seemingly as comfortable exercising judicial power as not. She did 
not maintain constant positions over time and presided over a Court that 
showed little compunction in overruling its own landmarks.5 On its face, 
her legacy perplexes.  
There remains a sense of unease or discomfort that this jurist’s 
essential view of justice was so well hidden from view. In a way, the 
explanation is simple. Promoting a vision was not her priority and 
Beverley McLachlin was not one to justify or glorify her work. If she did 
not withhold, nor did the judge advance a theory or philosophy that 
enlarged the contours of her decisions, binding the jurisprudence 
together. As a matter of self-description she placed herself in the middle, 
with a stated goal of judging cases “as honestly” as she could, “without 
                                                                                                                       
3 Philip Slayton, “Judging Beverley McLachlin” Maclean’s (July 9, 2009), online: 
<https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/judging-beverley/> [hereinafter “Slayton, ‘Respect’”]. 
4 Kirk Makin, “First female chief justice draws praise: Legal experts hail tough, 
independent Beverley McLachlin” The Globe and Mail (November 4, 1999) [hereinafter “Makin, 
‘First female chief justice’”] (article on file with author); Wallace, “Stepping Out”, supra, note 2. 
5 See, e.g., Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 
Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.); Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mounted 
Police Assn.”] and Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 245 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saskatchewan Federation of Labour”] (overruling the 
“Labour Trilogy”, see Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, id., at para. 106; Professional Institute of 
the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 
2 S.C.R. 367 (S.C.C.); Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.)); United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Burns”] (effectively overruling Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. 
No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kindler”]); Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bedford”] 
(effectively overruling R. v. Downey, [1992] S.C.J. No. 48, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Downey”]; “The Prostitution Reference”: Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal 
Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.)); and Carter v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”] (effectively 
overruling Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 
519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]). 
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becoming too strategic”, and keeping the law “clean, simple, and 
relevant”.6 By accounts, she invested little ego in decision-making, once 
remarking — modestly enough — that she would merely like to be 
remembered as a “competent” or a “good jurist, a serious jurist”.7  
That Justice McLachlin’s core commitments — what was sacred to 
her in judging — are relatively unknown heightens interest in her as a 
jurist. Offered here is an impression of a judge whose philosophy of 
justice and judging is, almost literally, hidden in plain sight. Sleuthing 
her extra-curial speeches and writings reveals that a jurisprudence, which 
on first impression appears plain-spoken and untroubled by theoretical 
concerns, was grounded in a process of internal dialectic. The elements 
of that dialectic, of what Justice McLachlin thought of as “reasoned legal 
conscience”, surface more freely in a venue of speeches, addresses, 
interviews, and publications.8 There she had opportunities, within the 
constraints of office, to comment more openly on her experience of 
judging. What emerges is a portrait of a jurist whose views are 
methodical, fastidious, and deceptively complex.  
The McLachlin dialectic confronted the tension between an 
unyielding commitment to the rule of law and a style of decision-making 
she described as “conscious objectivity”.9 For her it was a matter of 
choosing between the demands of law’s authority, in all its potential 
rigidity, and the need for justice to reflect values of empathy and 
humanity. To address that challenge she adopted a methodology that 
distilled the law’s “complex majesty”, balancing the rule of law’s legality 
and empathy’s humanity through a process of studied and disciplined 
flexibility.  
No one should assume this was an easy task for her. As Chief Justice 
she admitted to being preoccupied, agonizing about decisions and lying 
awake at night worrying about the impact of decisions on those “caught 
up in the machinery of justice”.10 Her calibrations favoured the rule of 
                                                                                                                       
6 Joseph Brean, “‘Conscious Objectivity’: That’s how the Chief Justice defines the top 
court’s role” National Post (May 23, 2015), online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/conscious-
objectivity-thats-how-the-chief-justice-defines-the-top-courts-role-harper-might-beg-to-differ> [hereinafter 
“Brean, ‘Conscious Objectivity’”]; Geoffrey Scotton, “McLachlin Responds to Allegations of 
Judicial Activism” The Lawyers Weekly (September 10, 1999) 19:17. 
7 Janice Tibbetts, “Building Consensus” Canadian Lawyer (July 2013) 24, at 26 [hereinafter 
“Tibbetts, ‘Building Consensus’”]; Kirk Makin, “Ten years as top judge and she’s still losing sleep” The 
Globe and Mail (January 10, 2010), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ten-
years-as-top-judge-and-shes-still-losing-sleep/article1366103/> [hereinafter “Makin, ‘Ten Years’”].  
8 McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles”, supra, note *, at 26.  
9 See discussion, infra. 
10 Makin, “Ten Years”, supra, note 7. 
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law on some occasions and other values, such as diversity, inclusion, and 
accommodating difference, on others. A jurisprudence attuned to that 
dynamic, focused in the moment on the demands of each context, neither 
aimed for nor conformed to pattern.  
Exploring the McLachlin dialectic does not produce a tidy account, 
and nor is that its aspiration. The discussion that follows offers a dialectic 
of its own, seeking insight into Beverley McLachlin’s manner of 
reconciling the law’s authority with justice’s humanity. Its scope is 
selective, travelling lightly over a monumental legacy by way of extra-
curial reflections and a sampling of the jurisprudence. Much in the way 
of the judge herself, its aims are modest and focus on identifying points 
of traction in the interactions between her core commitments in judging.  
II. IN HUMILITY AND INTEGRITY 
On taking office as Chief Justice, Beverley McLachlin promised to 
persevere “in humility and integrity” through a collective process of 
listening, considering and reconsidering, to find the “best answers, and 
hence the ‘right’ answers” to the difficult legal questions the Court would 
face.11 Over the years, she asked and answered all manner of profoundly 
challenging questions, in several hundreds of decisions. If a review and 
comparison of her pre- and post-Chief Justiceship jurisprudence cannot 
be undertaken, some context can at least be provided.   
At first impression, there are continuities but also differences between 
her two segments of office, which reflect her priorities as leader of the 
Court as well as an evolution in her judging. From 1989 to 2000, as 
puisne judge, McLachlin J. showed little reluctance to invalidate 
legislation and did so in high-profile cases.12 In time, the uncompromising 
voice of the 1990s softened, attenuating and folding into a style of 
decision-making adapted to her conception of the Chief Justice’s office. 
The headstrong independence and individualism that marked her 
jurisprudence in the first 10 years shifted to a style, as Chief Justice of 
Canada, that focused on the McLachlin Court’s hallmark of consensus-
based decision-making.13  
                                                                                                                       
11 Quoted in Cristin Schmitz, “Service to Country is Top of Her List” The Lawyers Weekly 
(January 28, 2000), 19:35. 
12 See infra, note 14. 
13 See Tibbetts, “Building Consensus”, supra, note 7. 
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The years following the Charter’s early landmarks were raucous. The 
Lamer Court fractured on divisive issues and its enforcement of Charter 
rights provoked voluble criticism. Rather than flinch Beverley McLachlin 
stepped confidently into the fray, delivering forthright, surprising, and 
controversial pronouncements on Charter rights.14 Rather than defer to 
then-Chief Justice Dickson or to the Court’s other women justices, 
Justices Wilson and L’Heureux Dubé, she staked her own path and at one 
point was described as “a sort of anti-Bertha”.15  
Justice McLachlin joined the Court at a time when women’s issues 
had high profile, the Charter’s conception of equality was formative, and 
the performance of its women judges was closely tracked by advocates 
and opponents of feminism alike. In this milieu she could be prickly, 
once stating that “[t]he day I wake up and look in the mirror and say, ‘I 
decided a case to please this interest group or that interest group’ — no 
matter how sympathetic I may be to their goals — that’s the day I’m not 
fit to be a judge”.16 Though scolded for her perceived insensitivity to 
women’s issues, feminists warmed to her during the 1990s.17 Determined 
to speak on her own, the judge at times wrote separately, occasionally 
appending brief and “antiseptic” concurrences to L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s 
more provocative reasons.18 She could also surprise, as when she teamed 
up with L’Heureux-Dubé J. to speak in a decidedly different voice in 
R. v. R.D.S.19  
                                                                                                                       
14 See, e.g., R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Seaboyer”]; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Keegstra”]; Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.); R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.); RJR-
MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”]. 
15 Fine, “The Most Important Woman”, supra, note 2, at 5 (noting that of the 17 cases she 
and Wilson J. heard together they only agreed once). 
16 Id. (also expressing the hope, id., at 9, that “both men and women can see me first and 
foremost as an impartial judge”).  
17 Paul Bunner, “McLachlin’s Choice: Aristocrat or Democrat?” Alberta Report (November 22, 
1999) 18 (noting that “prominent liberal feminists were expressing ‘satisfaction’ with her ‘evolving’ legal 
philosophy”). 
18 Slayton, “Respect”, supra, note 3. See, e.g., Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 
4 S.C.R. 695 (S.C.C.) (writing a concurring dissent to express agreement with her interpretation of the 
Tax Act and conclusion); R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.) (writing a 
separate concurrence to express her own concerns about stereotypical assumptions); Moge v. Moge, 
[1992] S.C.J. No. 107, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (S.C.C.) (writing separately and placing the focus on 
statutory interpretation). Justice L’Heureux-Dubé thought the two were “on the same wavelength” but 
said McLachlin “was reluctant to take risks”. Constance Backhouse, Claire L’Heureux-Dubé: A Life 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017), at 437. 
19 [1997] S.C.J. No. 8, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “R.D.S.”]. 
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When appointed Chief Justice in 2000, Beverley McLachlin was seen 
as “somebody who does not and will not fit into preconceived 
stereotypes”, and as a judge who has a “‘less transformative’ interpretation 
of the Charter as an agent of social change”.20 As one observer put it, 
Justice McLachlin “regards the law, with a capital L, above any cause or 
personal belief”.21 For most of her tenure as Chief Justice, the McLachlin 
Court tended to exercise judicial power quietly, even sparingly, at times 
turning to statutory interpretation or reading laws down to avoid 
invalidating statutes or granting a remedy.22 At a cadence of about one 
per year, the spacing between landmarks grew, and in 2010 the Chief 
Justice stated that “most of the significant Charter of rights battles” had 
been fought, leaving the Court to tinker with and refine doctrine.23 In an 
exit interview, Justice Binnie remarked, in similar terms, that the 
McLachlin Court was more of a consolidator than a “cutting-edge 
innovator”, before adding, “[w]hich is not to say that I see the court as 
timid”.24 
That view would prove premature as the landmarks issued, one after 
the other, in the McLachlin Court’s later years.25 Faced with opportunities 
and imperatives the Court responded boldly, demonstrating institutional 
confidence and conviction in its mission of review. This burst of activism 
bears the Chief Justice’s imprimatur and forms an important part of her 
legacy. With limited internal division and masterful leadership she 
moved the Court through a period of momentum and drama, rendering 
high impact decisions that bore the telltale signs of her straightforward, 
                                                                                                                       
20 Makin, “First female chief justice”, supra, note 4; J. Beltrame, “Judging Beverley: The 
Chief Justice is Putting her Stamp on the Supreme Court” Maclean’s (May 20, 2002) (article on file 
with author) [hereinafter “Beltrame, ‘Judging Beverley’”]. 
21 Beltrame, “Judging Beverley”, id. 
22 See, e.g., R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Sharpe”]; Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., [2010] 
S.C.J. No. 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 (S.C.C.).  
23 Makin, “Ten Years”, supra, note 7. 
24 Kirk Makin, “Justice Ian Binnie’s exit interview” The Globe and Mail (September 23, 
2011), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/justice-ian-binnies-exit-interview/ 
article2178895/singlepage>. 
25 See, e.g., Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 
S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.); Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704 
(S.C.C.) (government institutions); Mounted Police Assn., supra, note 5; Saskatchewan Federation 
of Labour, supra, note 5 (labour relations); Carter, supra, note 5; R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”] (s. 7 and s. 12 rights); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 (S.C.C.) (Aboriginal rights); Trial Lawyers 
Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2014] S.C.J. No. 59, [2014] 3 
S.C.R. 31 (S.C.C.) (access to justice). 
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bespoke logic. Rather than call attention to transformative change — 
which was not the Chief Justice’s way — the Court’s blockbusters often 
read as decisions that quite simply were dictated by the demands of 
justice.26  
As Chief Justice, Beverley McLachlin was a selfless leader who 
dedicated herself to the consummate task of promoting and protecting the 
institutional legitimacy of the Court. She was fiercely protective and, if it 
is difficult to know whether her formative years on the Lamer Court 
shaped this view, there can be little doubt that “protecting and preserving 
the Court’s reputation from political attack” was a priority.27 Most 
notably, when confronted by the Prime Minister of Canada, she defended 
the office of the Court, treating it as collateral that her name and 
reputation might be tarnished in the process.28 Meanwhile her 
jurisprudence reflected Justice McLachlin’s values of modesty, humility 
and selflessness, to the point of reaching “a certain effacement of who 
she is”.29 The Chief Justice made few claims for her legacy, allowing at 
most the hope that the McLachlin Court might be remembered as a 
“productive, respected Court” that took each case “as it [was] given” and 
tried to “do its best on every one of them”.30  
One constant over the years was the internal dialectic that defined her 
jurisprudence. As she once explained, in decision-making “one has to 
examine her conscience very carefully” and, for her, that meant engaging 
a dialectic between the rule of law and a conception of justice grounded 
in humanity.31 Paradoxically, Beverley McLachlin’s theory of judging 
was at once more straightforward and more complex than might appear. 
In her words, a judge must hold “uncompromisingly” to her conscience 
and “do justice” but “stay within the proper confines of [a judge’s] 
                                                                                                                       
26 See, e.g., Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. 
No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]; Bedford, supra, note 5. 
27 Beltrame, “Judging Beverley”, supra, note 20, at 28 (article on file with author). 
28 In 2014, then-Prime Minister Harper and then-Justice Minister MacKay publicly 
challenged the Chief Justice’s integrity on an appointments matter. See generally, J. Cameron, “Law, 
Politics and Legal Building at the McLachlin Court in 2014” (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3-22, at 20-24 
(describing these events and their impact on the Court). On retiring, the Chief Justice stated: “I never 
felt fear. I didn’t even feel anxiety …. I did not want it [the PMO news release] to tarnish the office 
of chief justice or the court. I had devoted my whole life, or a good part of it, to doing whatever I 
could to make the court a wonderful and hopefully respected institution. My concern was that 
somehow this might tarnish the image of the court.” Sean Fine, “How Beverley McLachlin found 
her bliss” The Globe and Mail (January 13, 2018), at A15, online: <https://www.theglobeandmail. 
com/news/national/beverley-mclachlin-profile/article37588525/> [hereinafter “Fine, ‘Bliss’”]. 
29 Fine, “Bliss”, id., at A13 (quoting David Sandomierski, a former law clerk). 
30 Tibbetts, “Building Consensus”, supra, note 7. 
31 Makin, “Ten Years”, supra, note 7. 
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role.”32 Conscience, in turn, was circumscribed by the rule of law and 
guided, in serving the fundamental principles of justice and democracy, 
by values of “good faith, reason, and diligence.”33 Rather than apply it 
clinically, the judge tempered the rule of law, in particular, through a 
style of decision-making she referred to as conscious objectivity. 
Resolving the tension between the law’s imperatives and what conscious 
objectivity’s humanity might require is the defining feature of her 
jurisprudence.  
III. THE RULE OF LAW: OUR MODERN SHAMAN34 
The rule of law is singular in our legal system and forms the main 
branch or trunk of our living tree constitutionalism.35 In its time and 
place, the rule placed a check on the arbitrary exercise of authority and 
promised that laws would apply equally to all.36 Now dismissed by some 
as “meaningless rhetoric”, the rule is evermore contested, at once 
signifying everything and nothing.37 Despite a “shared ideal or concept 
of the Rule of Law — marked in part by such traditional desiderata as 
that both ordinary citizens and public officials should be ruled by law,” 
there is “widespread confusion and uncertainty about the ideal’s precise 
content.”38 At best, it might be “no more than an honorific title for an 
amalgam of [] values”; at worst, it serves as an “analytic jumble that can 
foster nothing but confusion until its diverse and competing values are 
disaggregated”.39 Examining the richness of the concept of the rule of 
law is outside the scope of this paper.  
                                                                                                                       
32 McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles”, supra, note *, at 20-22, 24. 
33 Id., at 26. 
34 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “Diversity and the Rule of Law” 
[hereinafter “McLachlin, ‘Diversity’”] in R. Albert & D. Cameron, eds., Canada in the World: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 
at 33. 
35 See, e.g., Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.); 
Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights (Man.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 
(S.C.C.); Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.). 
36 See generally Peter W. Hogg & Cara F. Zwibel, “The Rule of Law in the Supreme Court 
of Canada” (Summer 2005) 55 U.T. L.J. 715 [hereinafter “Hogg & Zwibel”]. 
37 Id., at 716, 732. 
38 Richard Fallon, Jr., “‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse” (1997) 
97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, at 55 [hereinafter “Fallon”]; see also Allan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, 
eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) [hereinafter “Ideal or 
Ideology?”]. 
39 Fallon, id., at 41. 
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More to the point, Justice McLachlin formed a relationship of her 
own with the rule of law, returning to the topic often and with passion in 
her reflections and speeches.40 Her rule of law was constant and 
fastidious but fluid as well; she enforced its manifest and essential 
rigidity but allowed and even required it to evolve. That negotiation 
between the rule of law as imperative and its capacity to adapt is at the 
heart of the McLachlin jurisprudence.  
The rule of law is a principle of authority and means, emphatically, 
that the law’s commands must be obeyed.41 As Justice McLachlin 
explained, “a fundamental tenet of the rule of law is that all people are 
subject to its authority.”42 The essence of the rule is all encompassing, 
making “total claims upon the self” and leaving “no aspect of human 
experience unaffected by its claim to authority.”43 In principle 
uncompromising and egalitarian, the rule directs that laws of general 
application must apply without relief, exemption, or regard for individual 
circumstances.  
                                                                                                                       
40 See, e.g., “Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective” in 
Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion, and 
Public Policy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004) 9 [hereinafter 
“McLachlin, ‘Freedom of Religion’”]; The Right Honourable Madame Justice Beverley McLachlin, 
“Rules and Discretion in the Governance of Canada” (1992) 56 Sask. L. Rev. 167 [hereinafter 
“‘Rules and Discretion’”; “Unwritten Constitutional Principles”, supra, note *; “The Relationship 
Between the Courts and the Media” (speech delivered at Carleton University, January 31, 2012), 
online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2012-01-31-eng.aspx> [hereinafter “The 
Relationship Between the Courts and the Media”]; Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley 
McLachlin, P.C., “Administrative Tribunals and the Court: An Evolutionary Relationship” (speech 
delivered at the 6th Annual Conference of the Council of Canadian Administrative Tribunals, 
Toronto, ON, May 27, 2013), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2013-05-27-
eng.aspx> [hereinafter “‘An Evolutionary Relationship’”]; “Openness and the Rule of Law” (speech 
delivered at the Annual International Rule of Law Lecture, London, U.K., January 8, 2014), online: 
<https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/270848/jan_8__2014_-_12_pt.__rule_of_law_-_annual_inter 
national_rule_of_law_lecture.pdf> [hereinafter “Openness and the Rule of Law”]; “Reconciling 
Unity and Diversity in the Modern Era: Tolerance and Intolerance” (speech delivered at Annual 
Pluralism Lecture, Global Centre for Pluralism, Toronto, ON, May 28, 2015), online: 
<http://tomorrow.is/wp content/uploads/2016/12/20150528.BeverleyMcLachlin.GlobalCentrefor 
Plualism2.pdf> [hereinafter “‘Reconciling Unity and Diversity’”]; McLachlin, “Diversity”, supra, 
note 34; Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “The Decline of Democracy 
and the Rule of Law: How to Preserve the Rule of Law and Judicial Independence” (speech 
delivered at the Saskatchewan and Manitoba Courts of Appeal Joint Meeting, Saskatoon, SK, 
September 28, 2017) online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2017-09-28-
eng.aspx> [hereinafter “‘The Decline of Democracy and the Rule of Law’”]. 
41 Hogg & Zwibel, supra, note 36, at 716 (the rule of law “presupposes that laws will 
usually be obeyed” and breaches met with enforcement) and at 717 (“[a] culture of obedience to the 
law is [the rule of law’s] central requirement”). 
42 McLachlin, “Freedom of Religion”, supra, note 40, at 16. 
43 Id., at 9, 14. 
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Unless strict legality can be relaxed, the rule of law will necessarily 
support and require unjust outcomes, and the question that arises is 
whether and how humanity’s needs can be accommodated.44 A classic 
instance of this dilemma prior to the Charter is R. v. Morgentaler, 
which tested the status of necessity in a criminal prosecution against 
Dr. Morgentaler.45 Unsympathetic to the doctor’s claim that it was 
necessary to perform illegal abortions, Dickson J. strenuously defended 
the rule of law, stating unequivocally that individual conscience — and 
its perception of exigency — cannot override the law’s commands.46 By 
contrast, in allowing the necessity defence to prevail, Laskin C.J.C.’s 
dissent responded to the circumstantial needs of justice.47  
The Charter’s arrival in 1982 shifted this dilemma in a new direction, 
creating dual rules of law comprising the traditional rule, understood as 
parliamentary supremacy, and the constitutional rule, which confirms the 
Charter as the supreme law of the land.48 Justice McLachlin’s conception 
of the relationship between the two has been fluid over time, in part 
reflecting the rhythms of Charter interpretation as new-found rights and 
freedoms initially ascended and then settled. For instance, before being 
appointed Chief Justice, she remarked that “[o]ne instinctively doesn’t 
like to set aside legislation [which] has a good and salutary goal,” and 
added that “I don’t view it as the end of the world if the court says, ‘No, 
Parliament has gone too far’”.49 Many years later, as Chief Justice she 
declared that “[t]he courts have to be respectful of Parliament’s role and 
the executive’s role”, commenting as well that “[w]e’re often giving a 
                                                                                                                       
44 “Unwritten Constitutional Principles”, supra, note *, at 6 (explaining that “lawmakers 
may abuse their power by deviating from reason and enacting unjust laws” and that “just laws will 
become unjust in certain circumstances”). See also Hogg & Zwibel, supra, note 36, at 718 (stating 
that “[t]he rule of law is not a protection against laws that are bad”). 
45 [1975] S.C.J. No. 48, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morgentaler”]. 
46 Id., at 678 (stating that “[n]o system of positive law can recognize any principle which 
would entitle a person to violate the law because in his view the law conflicted with some higher 
social value”). But see R. v. Perka, [1984] S.C.J. No. 40, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.) (setting a 
standard for necessity) and R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) 
(invalidating the Criminal Code’s framework for therapeutic abortions under s. 7 of the Charter).  
47 Chief Justice Laskin would have restored the jury’s verdict of acquittal, on grounds of 
evidentiary sufficiency and because the illegal abortion concerned an emergency for a woman who 
was “a friendless stranger in this country, adrift more or less in an unfamiliar locality”: Morgentaler, 
id., at 655. 
48 Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 52(1). 
See Allan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, “Democracy and the Rule of Law” in Ideal or Ideology, 
supra, note 38, at 97-125 (discussing this juxtaposition and, at 100, lamenting the constitutional Rule 
of Law as a “clear check on the actual impact and expansion of a rigorous democracy”). 
49 Fine, “The Most Important Woman”, supra, note 2, at 6. 
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measure of deference to ministerial decisions and it’s not just lip 
service,” because Parliament has a right to make its choices.50  
As for its meaning, Justice McLachlin’s rule of law embraced the 
traditional conception as well as its enlargement and evolution. Noting 
that “[t]hings are not as simple as Dicey perceived them”, she observed 
that the rule of law more profoundly embodies “the fundamental 
expectations for decision-making in a democratic society”.51 
Functionally, the rule of law provides “a structure of legal and political 
values” and yields “at the periphery and sometimes at the core (as in the 
case of the Charter)” to the demands of “practicality, flexibility and 
individual justice”.52 Nor, in her view, can it foreclose discretion, as once 
thought, because decision-making does not “always call for one right 
answer in every case”.53  
Her extra-curial reflections returned, at intervals, to a familiar or 
favourite theme that, to be legitimate, the rule of law must be organic as 
well as robust.54 Institutionally, this insight was reflected in the 
recognition that public confidence in the judiciary is a cornerstone of the 
rule of law.  Justice McLachlin was fond of observing that the Court and 
judicial system belong to the Canadian public.55 She saw herself, the 
judiciary, and the courts as the servants of democracy and considered it 
essential to publicize what judges do.56 Realizing that access to justice 
engages foundational rule of law values, she acted on her commitment to 
an open, transparent, and accessible court. 
Justice McLachlin considered it the vital duty of courts and judges to 
advance and protect the law’s legitimacy, in part by inflecting it with 
organic content and flexibility. Under this view, the rule of law is 
dynamic and responsive to shifting conceptions of justice. Not long ago 
she even declared it our “modern shaman”, instilling values of listening 
                                                                                                                       
50 Brean, “Conscious Objectivity”, supra, note 6. 
51 “Rules and Discretion”, supra, note 40, at 168-69. 
52 Id., at 170, 171 (emphasis added). 
53 “An Evolutionary Relationship”, supra, note 40, at 5.  
54 Note also that judicial independence was another rule of law theme for her. See, e.g., 
“The Decline of Democracy and the Rule of Law”, supra, note 40. 
55 See, e.g., The Honourable Madame Justice Beverley McLachlin, “The Role of Judges in 
Modern Commonwealth Society” (1995) 53 Advocate 681, at 682 [hereinafter “‘The Role of 
Judges’”] (stating that judges in modern society are not “potentates” but “servants of the people in 
the highest and most honourable sense of that term”); Wallace, “Stepping Out”, supra, note 2 
(stating that the law is “not the preserve of the judges or a few lawyers” but is “the preserve of the 
people of Canada”). 
56 “The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media”, supra, note 40; “Openness and 
the Rule of Law”, supra, note 40. 
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and respecting one another to reach a concept of justice that harmonizes 
with social reality.57 In her words, “[t]he confidence of the citizen that 
her human dignity and right to choose to be different will be respected 
and enforced through the rule of law is the bedrock upon which civilized 
intercourse in a diverse society rests”.58  
This brief account of select extra-curial reflections brings to life a 
layered and formative conception of the rule of law that grounded 
Beverley McLachlin’s decision-making. A rule of law that for her was 
modern and shamanistic had richness and depth because it must: the law 
cannot demand obedience unless the democratic community accepts its 
legitimacy and has confidence that the justice system is fair and 
inclusive. This conception, which she articulated in a variety of speeches, 
allowed and required the law to accept “respectful accommodation” and 
the demands of diversity.59 A style of decision-making she referred to as 
conscious objectivity was the bridge between the conventional and 
shamanistic conceptions of the rule and her way of rendering the rule 
meaningful and responsive.   
IV. CONSCIOUS OBJECTIVITY 
Beverley McLachlin’s style of judging revolved around a concept of 
objectivity that she shaped and practised over the years.60 By her own 
description, decision-making is “an act of imagination” that draws on an 
“attitude of ‘active humility’”.61 Objectivity, in her conception, enabled a 
judge to set aside “preconceptions and prejudices” and achieve “a level 
of detachment.”62 In the moment, this methodology places a judge in a 
litigant’s shoes so that she can experience that person’s perspective 
before deciding what justice requires.63 
                                                                                                                       
57 McLachlin, “Diversity”, supra, note 34, at 33. 
58 “Reconciling Unity and Diversity”, supra, note 40, at 15. 
59 McLachlin, “Diversity”, supra, note 34, at 29 and 31. 
60 See, e.g., “The Role of Judges”, supra, note 55, at 685; The Right Honourable Beverley 
McLachlin, “The Supreme Court and the Public Interest” (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev. 309, at 315-16; Chief 
Justice of Canada McLachlin, “Judicial Power and Democracy” (2000) 12 Sing. Ac. L.J. 311, at 329 
[hereinafter “‘Judicial Power and Democracy’”]; “Judging: The Challenges of Diversity” (speech delivered 
at the Judicial Studies Committee Inaugural Annual Lecture, Edinburgh, Scotland, June 7, 2012), online: 
<http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/Upload/Documents/JSCInauguralLectureJune2012.pdf> [hereinafter 
“‘The Challenges of Diversity’”].  
61 “The Role of Judges”, id., at 685. 
62 Id. 
63 “Judicial Power and Democracy”, supra, note 60, at 329.  
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Looking back, a little-known incident at the outset of her Supreme 
Court tenure telegraphed this approach and demonstrated its power in 
decision-making. In the summer of 1989, only a few months after she 
was appointed, the Court heard an extraordinary, expedited appeal. The 
matter concerned an injunction Ms. Daigle’s abusive ex-partner had obtained 
to prevent her having an abortion. When the judges learned that Daigle 
had terminated her pregnancy before the hearing, Dickson C.J.C. 
“wanted to end the case on the spot”.64 That is reportedly when 
McLachlin J. intervened, inviting the judges to put themselves in 
Daigle’s position and imagine what it might be like to carry a fetus to 
term in the circumstances of that relationship.65 At the end of the hearing 
the Court quashed the injunction.66  
The McLachlin methodology embraced empathy but was more 
centred on a concept of objectivity. In light of her commitment to the rule 
of law, an approach too open to empathy in decision-making might have 
been out of character and uncomfortable for her. Justice McLachlin 
patterned her approach to decision-making in the 1990s when the Court’s 
other women judges — Justices Wilson and L’Heureux Dubé — were 
polarizing, controversial figures. While too much empathy was not the 
primary irritant, their decisions generated considerable discussion about 
women judges, the role of feminism, and concerns about judicial 
impartiality.  
The Charter furor of the 1990s demonstrated how controversy could 
erupt when decision-making departed from conventional understandings — 
or misunderstandings, depending on point of view — about the nature of 
judging. Subsequent debate about empathy in decision-making was 
triggered, in the United States, by then-Senator and later President 
Obama’s views on the attributes of a good judge.67 In at least some 
quarters, empathy was associated with “liberal activism” and dismissed 
as anathema to the rule of law.68 But as Obama explained, empathy is 
simply the ability to “imagine standing in [others’] shoes” and “imagine 
                                                                                                                       
64 Recounted in Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003), at 392-95. 
65 Justice McLachlin told the authors “I thought I could almost see [Dickson’s] face 
change”; id., at 394. 
66 Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] S.C.J. No. 79, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 (S.C.C.) (decision 
rendered on August 8, 1989 and reasons by “the Court” rendered on November 16, 1989).  
67 See generally, T. Colby, “In Defense of Judicial Empathy” (2012) 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1944 
[hereinafter “Colby”].  
68 Id., at 1952, n. 27. 
320 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
looking through their eyes.”69 Framed that way it is neutral because it is 
inclusive, calling “us all to task, the conservative and the liberal, the 
powerful and powerless, the oppressed and oppressor.”70 In practice, it 
counters complacency by confronting limited vision, serving as a form of 
perspective taking that sees and engages the emotions of another person’s 
circumstances.71 According to Richard Posner, an internal perspective — 
the putting oneself in the other person’s shoes — is an exercise of 
empathetic imagination that lacks normative significance.72  
Justice McLachlin’s concept of conscious objectivity resonated with 
that conception of judicial empathy and aligned with her idea of 
“informed impartiality”.73 She acknowledged that subjective influences, 
including emotions and a sense of justice, are part of objectivity, and are 
not an unwelcome or intrusive influence.74 Impartiality in a diverse 
society does not mean that all preconceptions and personal inclinations 
must be eliminated, though it does require a judge to evaluate and 
identify inappropriate preconceptions and prejudices.75 Under this view, 
impartiality is promoted through mindful attention to introspectiveness, 
openness, and empathy, which are the sensibilities that expose a judge to 
the phenomenon of difference. In particular, empathy emphasizes the 
“common humanity of us all” and recognizes the “legitimacy of diverse 
experiences and viewpoints.”76  
In Justice McLachlin’s conception, a judge who is able to use her 
imagination and systematically imagine how each sees the situation will 
“truly hear the parties who appear before her.”77 Fundamentally, that is 
what litigants want: “a judge who is aware of the influence of her own 
experiences and perspectives, who is willing to act on different views 
and ideas and who has the capacity to truly hear and understand the 
perspectives of all those who come before her.”78 Described that way, 
conscious objectivity is in harmony with an evolved and shamanistic 
conception of the rule of law. In other words, to ensure its authority and 
                                                                                                                       
69 Quoted in Colby, id., at 1963-64. 
70 Id., at 1963 (quoting President Obama). 
71 Id., at 1958. 
72 Richard Posner, Overcoming Law (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1995), at 381. 
73 “The Challenges of Diversity”, supra, note 60, at 6. 
74 See R.D.S., supra, note 19, at para. 29 (stating that while judges “can never be neutral” 
they must “strive for impartiality”) and at para. 38 (stating that judges “cannot be expected to 
divorce themselves” from their pre-judicial experiences). 
75 “The Challenges of Diversity”, supra, note 60, at 13. 
76 Id., at 12. 
77 Id., at 13. 
78 Id. 
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legitimacy, the rule of law must embrace diversity, tolerance, inclusion, 
and the accommodation of difference — which are precisely the values 
engaged by this methodology. Not to embrace and engage through this 
process, in her view, would place public confidence in the courts, the 
judiciary, and the law itself at risk.79   
The discussion that follows these themes through her jurisprudence 
can do no more than offer a preliminary, limited, and selective glimpse of 
the judge at work over the years. This glimpse shows a focus on decision-
making “in the small” — finding the best answer in the moment — and 
not on grand theory or transformative change. It is evident, throughout, 
that the rule of law served as a default setting for her in a dialectic that 
was fluid. Moreover, Justice McLachlin’s brand of conscious objectivity 
was intuitive, taking guidance from the values that informed and 
constituted her reasoned legal conscience. What emerged through her 
process of internal dialectic was less a theory of justice than a manner of 
decision-making that presents its own distinctive — even singular — 
conception of justice.  
V. INTERNAL DIALECTIC: THE LAW IN CAPS  
AND THE EMPATHETIC IMAGINATION 
As puisne judge, Beverley McLachlin went “out of her way to be non 
ideological” because, as one observer explained, “she believes in the law — 
THE LAW in caps”.80 At the time she expressed the hope that, despite 
being perceived as tough, the “humanity and caring” in her decision-
making would be understood.81 On retiring, the Chief Justice reinforced 
the point, stating “[i]t’s the humanity in every case that is so important to 
me, and it always has been”.82 Her jurisprudence offers a narrative of 
these core commitments — the rule of law and humanity — and their 
dialectical interaction over time.   
A suite of decisions on mental disorder in the criminal law is the 
starting point because it provides striking example of the dialectic at 
work, offering direct and valuable insight into Justice McLachlin’s 
decision-making process. Early in her tenure on the Court she wrote a 
                                                                                                                       
79 Id., at 5, 24 (stating that the ultimate challenge of judging in a diverse society is public 
confidence in the judiciary and the rule of law). See also “Reconciling Unity and Diversity”, supra, 
note 40, at 15-16 (explicitly linking tolerance and respect for diversity to the rule of law). 
80 Fine, “The Most Important Woman”, supra, note 2, at 8 (quoting DeLloyd Guth). 
81 Id. 
82 Fine, “Bliss”, supra, note 28. 
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dissent in R. v. Chaulk that privileged logic and legality at the expense of 
insight.83 After finding that the presumption of sanity in section 16(4) of 
the Criminal Code84 did not violate the Charter, she concluded that a 
section 16 defence was unavailable where an individual committed an 
act, knowing it was against the law.85 Her analysis of “knows” and 
whether it should support a broad or narrow section 16(2) defence can 
best be described as formalistic. Justice McLachlin was unable or 
unwilling to accept that mental disorder can compel an individual to act 
on delusions or other forms of disorder, despite knowing the law. Not 
surprisingly, her concerns were grounded in rule of law considerations; 
she considered it fundamentally problematic to grant the defence to a 
person who knew an act was legally wrong. In her view, “absence of 
moral appreciation is no excuse for criminal conduct.”86 
Less than 10 years later, her landmark decision in Winko v. British 
Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), expressed a different 
appreciation of mental disorder and those found not criminally 
responsible (“NCR”).87 In the interim, she backtracked from her dissent 
in Chaulk, all but abandoning it in R. v. Oommen.88 There, the evidence 
established that the defendant knew murder was legally wrong but was 
subject to powerful delusions. In such circumstances, McLachlin J. 
recognized that mental disorder may deny an individual the capacity and 
choice to obey the law. Her majority reasons finessed Chaulk’s focus on 
legal versus moral wrong by asking whether mental disorder deprived 
Oommen of the capacity to exercise a rational choice between the two.89 
Recognizing that a break with reality can destroy an individual’s capacity 
to obey the law dispelled the rule of law concerns that troubled her so 
greatly in Chaulk. 
Only a few years later, Justice McLachlin’s ground-breaking decision 
in Winko established a framework of principle for Part XX.1’s system of 
                                                                                                                       
83 [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaulk”]. 
84 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [“hereinafter “Criminal Code”]. 
85 Chaulk, supra, note 83, at 1398-1403 (maintaining that the presumption relates to the 
capacity for choice and not to the elements of the offence or to particular defences) and at 1408 
(stating that s. 16(2) uses the word “wrong” without modification and “should be read simply in the 
sense of what ought not to be done or omitted”). 
86 Id., at 1411 (emphasis added) and 1412 (asking why it should matter whether an 
individual’s moral mechanism broke down because of a disease of the mind and not because of a 
“morally impoverished upbringing”). 
87 [1999] S.C.J. No. 31, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Winko”]. 
88 [1994] S.C.J. No. 60, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.). 
89 Id., at 516, 518, 520 (drawing a distinction between abstract knowledge that an act is 
wrong and the capacity to apply that knowledge). 
(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) MCLACHLIN’S LAW 323 
forensic detention for NCR and unfit criminal offenders. Winko was the 
Court’s first opportunity to address Parliament’s overhaul of forensic 
mental justice under the Charter, and it achieved a masterful balance 
between the criminal law’s goals of protecting public safety and 
promoting the rehabilitation of forensic offenders.90 Though Winko is a 
landmark for many reasons, what stands out is McLachlin J.’s response 
to the vulnerability of mentally disordered offenders. It is significant, for 
example, that Winko drew a strong and careful distinction between 
punishment and treatment, stressing that mentally disordered offenders 
can only be detained for legitimate treatment purposes.91 In addition, her 
Winko reasons firmly indicated that the exacting standard of least 
onerous and least restrictive applies to restrictions on the liberty of NCR 
offenders.92 Of greatest interest is Justice McLachlin’s evident empathy 
for those who suffer from mental illness. After noting that the mentally ill 
have “long been subject to negative stereotyping and social prejudice” 
she repeated, throughout her reasons, that Part XX.1 offenders must at all 
times be treated with the utmost fairness and respect for their dignity.93   
The contrast is dramatic: while Chaulk elevated abstract, formalistic 
reasoning, Winko represented an act of empathetic imagination. Together, 
these decisions witness an important and compelling shift, in less than  
10 years, that speaks to Justice McLachlin’s openness and humility as a 
jurist. Just as formalism can be found elsewhere in her jurisprudence, 
Winko’s attention to fairness for forensic offenders is emblematic of her 
ability to mesh the rule of law with the humanity and caring that was so 
important to her. Though there were other shifts in direction, none was as 
revealing of the internal dialectic’s evolution as Chaulk, Oommen, and 
Winko.94 
                                                                                                                       
90 See R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) (invalidating the 
automatic detention of those found not guilty by reason of insanity); Criminal Code, supra, note 84, 
Part XX.1 was enacted in 1991, S.C. 1991, c. 43. 
91 Winko, supra, note 87, at para. 41 (stating, among other things, that the NCR offender is 
not criminally responsible, but ill and that “[p]roviding opportunities to receive treatment, not 
imposing punishment, is the just and appropriate response” (emphasis added)). 
92 Id., at para. 42. 
93 Id., at paras. 35 and 42 (stating that “... Parliament has signalled that the NCR accused is 
to be treated with the utmost dignity and afforded the utmost liberty compatible with his or her 
situation”). 
94 See discussion of Kindler, supra, note 5, and Burns, supra, note 5. 
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VI. LEGALITY’S RULE OF LAW 
It is a judge’s sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and Justice 
McLachlin was not one to shirk that duty. Her commitment to the rule of 
law is the frame in which her jurisprudence rests and, as a few examples 
attest, she did not hesitate to protect the law’s authority when she thought 
it necessary.    
On several occasions Justice McLachlin supported labour unions, 
though not when the rule of law was directly at stake.95 In United Nurses 
of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), she decided against a union and 
in doing so expressed an uncompromising view of judicial authority.96 In 
strong reasons she described strike action in contravention of a legal 
directive as an act of “public defiance”, an “open, continuous and flagrant 
violation of a court order”. Justice McLachlin reacted to the impact on “the 
respect accorded to edicts of the court”, upholding the conviction for 
contempt because the rule of law is “at the heart of our society”; as she 
declared, “without it there can be neither peace, nor order nor good 
government.”97 Justice Cory’s dissent strongly challenged her rule of law 
analysis, claiming that the offence requires a serious public injury, and 
warning against the use of criminal contempt on labour issues.98  
Justice McLachlin invoked the rule of law in contempt proceedings 
again in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, which concerned the 
constitutionality of federal legislation transferring jurisdiction over 
charges against minors to youth court.99 While Lamer C.J.C. found the 
provision unconstitutional because it undermined the Court’s authority, 
McLachlin J.’s dissent held that courts must conform to the rule of law 
and “abide by the dictates of the legislature”, including laws placing limits 
on their powers.100 For her the rule of law was governing, and the 
Court was bound to accept Parliament’s decision to alter the jurisdiction 
of the courts. 
                                                                                                                       
95 See, e.g., Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola 
Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.) (secondary 
picketing); Health Services, supra, note 5 (collective bargaining); Mounted Police Assn., supra, note 5 
(collective bargaining) with LeBel J. 
96 [1992] S.C.J. No. 37, [1992] 1 S.C.R 901 (S.C.C.). The Alberta Labour Relations Board 
directive was filed with the Court of Queen’s Bench.  
97 Id., at 932 and 931 (commenting, also, that the rule is “directly dependent on the ability 
of the courts to enforce their process and maintain their dignity and respect”).  
98 Id., at 913 and 915 (setting a high threshold of violence for the rule of law and adding 
that using contempt against labour unions could reflect adversely on judicial impartiality). 
99 [1995] S.C.J. No. 101, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.). 
100 Id., at para. 80. 
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Justice McLachlin also wrote strongly on behalf of Aboriginals and their 
communities, though not when the rule of law was at risk.101 In R. v. Nikal, 
the Court restored an Aboriginal man’s acquittal on a charge of fishing 
without a licence.102 Justice Cory found that although the licence 
requirement did not violate section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
the conditions for the licence did.103 Justice McLachlin strongly objected 
to the suggestion that collateral issues could excuse the failure to obtain a 
licence. Whatever their nature, defective or impermissible conditions 
could not negate a requirement that licensed activities — whether for 
fishing, discharging pollutants, or driving a car — be duly authorized.104 
Justice McLachlin also set herself apart in R. v. Marshall’s decision to 
extend Aboriginal fishing rights.105 There, she challenged a definition of 
the right as an indeterminate, “generalized abstraction”, because it could 
only function “illegitimately” to create an entitlement of broad and 
undefined scope.106 Doubt about the legitimacy of the Court’s authority 
to extend title in that way raised rule of law issues for her. The day after 
being appointed Chief Justice, and without referring directly to Marshall, 
she stated that “[y]ou cannot divorce the law … from the consequences,” 
admonishing that judges should give thought to how their rulings will fit 
“the institutional matrix of society”.107 It was her way of processing 
concerns about Marshall’s consequences for the legitimacy and authority 
of the law. 
The rule of law was otherwise pervasive in her decision-making, at 
times in unexpected contexts.  For instance, Justice McLachlin invoked 
the rule of law in R. v. Keegstra108 to limit the scope of section 2(b) of the 
Charter. Despite concluding that the Criminal Code’s hate propaganda 
provision was unconstitutional, her dissent adopted a narrow approach to 
the Charter’s guarantee of expressive freedom. After agreeing that “[t]he 
nature of the content of expression can never function to exclude it” from 
                                                                                                                       
101 See, e.g., Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44 
(S.C.C.); Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.). 
102 [1996] S.C.J. No. 47, [1996] 1 S.C.R 1013 (S.C.C.). 
103 Id.  
104 Id., at para. 74. 
105 [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.), Gonthier J., concurring [hereinafter 
“Marshall”]. 
106 Id., at para. 112. 
107 “McLachlin’s Choice”, supra, note 17, at 3. Meantime, Marshall stirred so much 
controversy that the Court took the unprecedented step of issuing a clarification: R. v. Marshall, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 66, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 (S.C.C.). 
108 Supra, note 14. 
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section 2(b), she held that violence and threats of violence are an affront 
to the rule of law and not protected by the Charter.109 Over the course of 
time that position was confirmed in several decisions.110  
Justice McLachlin’s disapproval of constitutional exemptions was 
also rooted in the rule of law. In R. v. Ferguson, she held that the 
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences cannot be addressed 
on a case-by-case basis, because that would render “the bright line 
required for constitutional certainty elusive.”111 Under her reasoning, 
exemptions buy flexibility but undermine the rule of law, and she simply 
could not abide a remedy that determined the scope of the law’s authority 
on a case-by-case basis.112 A similar issue arose with the Court’s practice 
of suspending declarations of invalidity, leaving unconstitutional 
provisions in place to enable a parliamentary response during the 
suspension period. Whatever that implies for the constitutional rule of 
law, Justice McLachlin refused to grant an exemption to those who 
remained subject to an invalid but enforceable law. An exemption could 
only be sought and granted on a selective, ad hoc and potentially 
arbitrary basis and that, in her view, undermined the law’s authority. As 
noted below, she maintained this position even when it imposed severe 
hardship on individuals.113   
The rule of law, conventionally understood, was fundamental to 
Justice McLachlin’s decision-making. As a few examples demonstrate, 
enforcing the law’s authority was her first priority. This duty also drew 
her toward formalistic reasoning in some instances.  
A well-known example is R. v. Hess, where she maintained that a 
Criminal Code provision prohibiting sexual intercourse with a female 
under age 14 violated section 15 of the Charter because it failed to 
                                                                                                                       
109 Id., at 826 (emphasis added) and at 830. Compare Dickson C.J.C., at 731-32 (concluding 
that threats of violence can only be classified by their content and are not excluded from s. 2(b)). 
110 See, e.g., R. v. Khawaja, [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khawaja”] (stating, at para. 70, that excluding acts of violence from s. 2(b) but 
including threats of violence makes little sense: neither is worthy of protection because both 
undermine the rule of law).  
111 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at para. 71 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Ferguson”]. 
112 Id., at para. 67; see generally, id., paras. 67-73 (discussing the rule of law). 
113 In addition to Ferguson, id., see Carter, supra, note 5 (denying exemptions during the 
period of suspended invalidity of the criminal prohibition on assisted suicide, on rule of law 
grounds); see also Carter v. Canada, [2016] S.C.J. No. 4, 2016 SCC 4, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 13 (S.C.C.) 
(dissenting opinion, confirming this view) [hereinafter “Carter II”]. 
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protect males of the same age.114 In dismissing this logic as “rigid 
formalism”, Wilson J. cautioned against “an overly simple comparison” 
of men and women.115 While agreeing that “[i]t borders on the fictional 
to suppose” that males could require this protection, McLachlin J. 
refused to compromise on the abstract question of constitutional law. No 
person should be convicted under an invalid law, and it was therefore 
open to a defendant to raise any available constitutional defect.116 Her 
reasoning was principled, if formalistic: to her an unconstitutional 
provision was an insult to the rule of law that invited invalidation, 
regardless of the status of the party before the Court.117  
The point warrants a textual footnote on mandatory minimum 
sentences under section 12. In R. v. Goltz, McLachlin J.’s dissent would 
have invalidated the sentencing provision in its entirety to avoid the 
prospect of reading it down and effectively applying a constitutional 
exemption on a case-by-case basis.118 In reaching that conclusion she 
relied on her controversial decision in R. v. Seaboyer.119 R. v. Nur was yet 
more explicit, pronouncing that the rule of law is manifestly offended 
when “bad laws” are left on the books.120 Like Hess, Nur cited Big M for 
the proposition that no one should be subjected to an unconstitutional 
law; as she stated, the Constitution belongs to all citizens, “who share a 
right to the constitutional application of the laws of Canada.”121  
By its nature the rule of law is a matter of discipline and logic. As seen 
above McLachlin J. thought so in Chaulk122 and Nikal,123 but also in 
Kindler.124 There, she concluded that extradition to the United States, 
without assurances that capital punishment would not be sought, did not 
                                                                                                                       
114 [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion, finding a 
justifiable breach of s. 15 and upholding the s. 15 and s. 7 breach under s. 1 of the Charter). 
115 Id., at 929. 
116 Id., at 946. 
117 Id., at 945-46 (citing R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 
(S.C.C.)). See also Keegstra, supra, note 14, at 849; Zundel, supra, note 14, at 743 (maintaining, in 
both instances, that the Court’s focus was on the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions and 
not on the offensiveness of the expression). 
118 [1991] S.C.J. No. 19, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485, at 526 (S.C.C.). But, see Sharpe, supra, note 22 
(employing statutory interpretation to make child pornography legislation consistent with the 
Charter).  
119 Id., at 525-26; Seaboyer, supra, note 14. 
120 Supra, note 25, at para. 51 (invalidating one of Parliament’s mandatory minimum 
sentences for firearms offences). 
121 Id. 
122 Supra, note 83. 
123 Supra, note 102. 
124 Supra, note 5.  
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offend section 12’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Setting 
Canada’s decision to extradite off and formalistically compartmentalizing it 
from the issue of punishment enabled her to find that capital punishment 
did not violate the Charter. In purely formal terms — though surely not in 
reality — Canada’s extradition had nothing to do with any decision to 
impose or carry out capital punishment.125     
Justice McLachlin’s commitment to the rule of law rarely wavered. 
Yet, as noted, justice and humanity were high-priority values in her 
decision-making. She reconciled those values with the duty to uphold the 
rule of law through a form of dialectic between the two. For her, 
confronting and resolving that tension was a matter of judicial 
conscience.  
VII. EMPATHY’S RULE OF LAW 
Though her role behind the scene in Daigle v. Tremblay provides an 
earlier and compelling example, Justice McLachlin first spoke of 
conscious objectivity in 1995.126 In a certain way conscious objectivity 
placed a check on the rule of law because it contemplated a process of 
careful listening — and positioning — to consider, openly and 
emphatically, humanity’s context and how it could or should be 
accommodated. Despite a preoccupation with this approach, Justice 
McLachlin never promised or even suggested that conscious objectivity 
would favour any point of view. Her level of empathetic engagement 
varied, in part because it interacted with and was subject to the rule of 
law, and also because it reflected her core views about what was 
fundamentally just or unjust in different settings. “Empathy without an 
agenda” was therefore a fitting description of her approach as her 
empathetic imagination was activated in some contexts but not in 
others.127  
Two decisions from the 1990s show her dialectic at work in 
circumstances where the practice of conscious objectivity reinforced rule 
of law analytics. Justice McLachlin’s dissent in R. v. Downey provides an  
 
                                                                                                                       
125 Id., at 846-47 (stating that the effect of any Canadian law or government act is “too 
remote” from the possible imposition of the penalty to “attract the attention of s. 12”). The Court 
found it unnecessary to overrule Kindler in Burns, supra, note 5, and avoided awkwardness for the 
newly appointed Chief Justice by deciding the case by anonymous opinion by “the Court”. 
126 McLachlin, “The Role of Judges”, supra, note 55, at 685. 
127 Fine, “The Most Important Woman”, supra, note 2, at 6. 
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illustration. There she was earnest, verging on angry, in describing the 
irrational and unfair effects of the Criminal Code’s prohibition against 
living on the avails of prostitution.128 In invalidating the prohibition she 
pointed to its dire effects on the lives of prostitutes, depriving them of 
“human relationships”, isolating them from friends or family, and forcing 
them, predictably, “onto the streets or into the exploitive power of 
pimps”.129 Coming from a judge who had quickly established herself as a 
confident jurist it was an unusually powerful dissent.130  
Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance) is notable for a different 
reason.131 Though it reads primarily as a decision that is focused on 
technical analysis, McLachlin J.’s dissent made explicit and empathetic 
reference to the parties who would be affected. The issue there was 
whether the Canada Assistance Plan permitted a province to make 
deductions from assistance payments to cover the overpayment of social 
benefits.132 Justice McLachlin’s reasons called attention to the “human 
reality of persons in need”, who have no savings or reserves and who — 
without their monthly allocation of basic needs — would be left without 
food, shelter and other basic necessities.133 That human reality 
complemented the legal analysis and for her formed an important part of 
her reasoned legal conscience. 
In Downey and Finlay, McLachlin J. blended powerful analysis with a 
conception of justice grounded in humanity. When synchronization was 
not possible, she at times acknowledged the dilemma but adopted the 
default position, enforcing the rule of law. Decisions that might have 
kept her up at night, worrying about those “caught up in the machinery of 
justice,” include Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General)134 and British Columbia (Attorney General) v. 
Christie;135 in both she explicitly voiced her sympathy for parties whose 
                                                                                                                       
128 Supra, note 5. 
129 Id., at 47. 
130 See “Stereotyping means unfair justice system for women” The Lawyers Weekly 11:2 
(May 10, 1991) (on file with author) (quoting from a speech by McLachlin J. which was highly 
critical of the criminal law’s treatment of women, including by attacking the problem of prostitution 
by “putting the burden squarely on the shoulders of women”). 
131 [1993] S.C.J. No. 39, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1080 (S.C.C.). 
132 Id. 
133 Id., at 1117-18. 
134 [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Auton”]. 
135 [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, 2007 SCC 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Christie”]. 
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claims she nonetheless rejected.136 Most poignant, perhaps, was the status 
of assisted suicide in the wake of Carter, which left the Criminal Code’s 
prohibition in place during the period of suspended invalidity.137 In 
refusing to grant constitutional exemptions, the four dissenting judges in 
Carter II — which included the Chief Justice — stated that “... [w]e do 
not underestimate the agony of those who continue to be denied access to 
the help they need to end their suffering.”138 Despite empathetic 
consideration that were impossible to ignore, the rule of law governed 
and the dissenting opinion found that the issue could only be addressed 
through an orderly process of democratic law-making.  
As a form of “contextualized judging”, conscious objectivity was 
deeply influenced by perceptive sensibility, and that may explain why the 
judge’s empathy was more readily activated in some contexts than 
others. At times she seemed to apply a reverse methodology, placing the 
litigant in the shoes of a third party, or reasonable person, and assessing 
the claim from that perspective. These are the claims that fell short on 
values of justice and humanity and did not resonate with Justice 
McLachlin’s judicial conscience.   
An example is Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union,139 
which concerned a non-member’s objection to mandatory union dues that 
supported non-workplace objectives. Skeptical that section 2(d) could 
even include an element of non-association, McLachlin J. accepted a 
right of freedom from “enforced association with ideas and values”, but 
proposed a narrow conception of breach based on forced ideological 
conformity.140 Under this view, compelled association would only matter 
under section 2(d) when an individual was “reasonably associated” with 
an objectionable message; in other words, coercion was not a matter of 
subjective perception but determined, instead, by objective assessment.141 
Abstracting the issue of compulsion and deflecting it to an objective 
                                                                                                                       
136 Makin, “Ten Years”, supra, note 7. Auton, supra, note 134, at para. 2 (stating that “[o]ne 
sympathizes with the petitioners” who sought health care funding for autistic children); Christie, id., 
at para. 29 (stating that “[n]otwithstanding our sympathy for Mr. Christie’s cause” we are compelled 
to dismiss his challenge to a provincial tax on legal services). 
137 Carter, supra, note 5 (invalidating the assisted suicide provision but suspending the 
declaration of invalidity to give Parliament an opportunity to enact a new law). 
138 Supra, note 113, at para. 14. 
139 [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.). 
140 Id., at 343-44 (stating only that she was “inclined to the view” that compulsory 
association violates s. 2(d)). 
141 Id., at 344-45 (also explaining that “public identification” is not necessarily a prerequisite 
because the question is whether there is activity, when fairly adjudged, that brings an individual 
involuntarily into association with ideas and values).  
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bystander was a clear departure from conscious objectivity. In the 
circumstances, McLachlin J. may have harboured rule of law concerns 
about a definition of section 2(d) that would enable individuals to 
dissociate from various legal responsibilities and obligations.142  
Another illustration is Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),143 
which considered whether a provincial benefits scheme discriminated 
against welfare recipients under age 30. Gosselin was potentially a 
landmark because it posed a threshold question about the imposition of 
positive obligations under the Charter.144 Facing a 5-4 split and powerful 
dissenting opinions by Arbour, Bastarache and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ., the 
Chief Justice dismissed the appellant’s challenge as “utterly 
implausible”.145 In her view there was no breach of section 15 because a 
“reasonable person” in Gosselin’s position would have understood the 
merits of the program. Once “reasonabilized”, Gosselin would realize 
that the scheme did not treat her and others her age as “less worthy and 
less deserving of respect” in a way that marginalized or denigrated 
them.146 As in Lavigne this analysis essentially reversed the method of 
conscious objectivity; rather than place herself in Gosselin’s shoes, the 
Chief Justice appeared to do the opposite, putting Louise Gosselin in the 
shoes of a putatively reasonable welfare recipient and assessing the claim 
from that perspective.  
In addition, a cluster of decisions suggests that conscious objectivity 
was less intuitive for Justice McLachlin in the interface between law and 
religion.147 In an extra-curial reflection she wrote of the rule of law’s 
“seemingly paradoxical task” of preserving its authority and “carving out 
a space within itself” to recognize the dignity of individuals and 
communities bound by a religious world view and ethos.148 At the time, 
                                                                                                                       
142 Compare with RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 14 (finding that mandatory unattributed 
warnings on tobacco packages violate “the right to say nothing” and were not justified under s. 1). 
143 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.). 
144 Id. 
145 Id., at para. 47. 
146 Id., at paras. 44, 69. 
147 Compare Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12, 2015 
SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) (carving out a space for religion within the rule of law) and 
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 
S.C.R. 37 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wilson Colony”] (discussed infra), and Ktunaxa Nation v. British 
Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), [2017] S.C.J. No. 54, 2017 SCC 54, 
[2017] 2 S.C.R. 286 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ktunaxa Nation”] (restricting the scope of religious 
freedom, holding that (at para. 71) “... The state’s duty under s. 2(a) is not to protect the object of 
beliefs, such as Grizzly Bear Spirit”). 
148 McLachlin, “Freedom of Religion”, supra, note 40, at 16 and 28. 
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she supported accommodation, but only if it would not compromise the 
“integrity of the rule of law and the values for which it stands”.149 As her 
section 2(a) jurisprudence makes clear, Justice McLachlin was 
fundamentally troubled by the tension between religious freedom and the 
rule of law. Yet in resolving this tension she was reluctant to forsake the 
rule of law; when religion competed with law’s authority, her modern 
shaman was not generous enough to carve a space out for forms of 
observance that imposed a cost on society.150 
Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer demonstrates that the 
judge’s analysis on matters of religion could be formalistic and even 
clinical.151 While the majority decision concluded that dissident members 
of the community were expelled in violation of natural justice, her 
dissent described the church as “open, considered and eminently fair.”152 
Rather than fault the church she found that by rejecting the “offer” of 
punishment the appellants chose not to return to the community. In her 
view, those who had “self-expelled” from the community could not ask 
the law to look with favour on their claim.153  
The judge’s concurring reasons in Adler v. Ontario154 are important 
because they foreshadowed her majority opinion in Wilson Colony.155 In 
Adler she noted that “[v]irtually every aspect of human conduct is 
capable of being the subject of religious belief”, and recognized that 
religious belief or conduct will inevitably conflict with “the legal 
prescriptions of society”.156 While agreeing that the state’s denial of 
funding for private religious day schools was a form of discrimination, 
she found that it did not strike at “the heart of the religion” or compel 
individuals to violate their beliefs.157 That it imposed a burden on 
religious practice did not render it unconstitutional.  
                                                                                                                       
149 Id., at 28. 
150 See Howard Kislowicz, “Part III: Chief Justice McLachlin, Collective Religious Freedom 
Rights, and the Space for Religion Within the Rule of Law”, I-CONnect Symposium on “The 
Legacy of Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin” (December 6, 2017), online: <http://www. 
iconnectblog.com/2017/12/kislowicz-on-chief-justice-mclachlin/> (stating that “[p]erhaps anxiety 
about the rule of law’s continued authority helps explain judicial reticence about collective rights”). 
151 [1992] S.C.J. No. 87, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165 (S.C.C.). 
152 Id., at 232. 
153 Id., at 232 and 229-30.  
154 [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Adler”]. 
155 Supra, note 147.  
156 Adler, supra, note 154, at para. 224 (challenging the province’s failure to fund private 
religious day schools under ss. 2(a) and 15 of the Charter). 
157 Id., at para. 223. 
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That point of view set up her majority opinion in Wilson Colony, 
where she echoed Adler’s distinction between coercive interference with 
religious freedom and a mere failure by the state to relieve the cost of 
complying with the law.158 The context was a mandatory driver’s licence 
photo and whether it violated the section 2(a) rights of Hutterites who are 
prohibited by the Second Commandment from allowing an image to be 
taken. Stating that the Charter does not “indemnify practitioners against 
all costs incident to the practice of religion”, the Chief Justice 
maintained, to the contrary, that society “reasonably” expects adherents 
to bear such costs.159 In a lapse of empathetic imagination — which 
again reversed the practice of conscious objectivity — she proposed that 
colony members who were unable to drive could simply hire drivers or 
arrange for third parties to provide transportation.160  
Generally, her section 2(a) jurisprudence confirmed Justice 
McLachlin’s unwillingness to accommodate religious freedom. Other 
decisions that invite deeper analysis include R. v. S. (N.),161 Ktunaxa 
Nation v. British Columbia,162 and Law Society of British Columbia v. 
Trinity Western University.163 It is clear that these issues posed a 
fundamental and distinctive test of the judge’s process of internal 
dialectic.  
Finally, the limits of conscious objectivity were also evident in  
R. v. Khawaja, which engaged section 2’s fundamental freedoms globally 
in a challenge to the motive clause in the Criminal Code’s definition of 
terrorism.164 The Chief Justice curtly rejected the claim. As she 
explained, “[a]nyone who reads the entire provision” would realize that it 
does not target protected expression, and therefore a chilling effect could 
                                                                                                                       
158 Id. 
159 Wilson Colony, supra, note 147, at para. 95. 
160 Id., at para. 97. As Abella J. put it in dissent, the mandatory photo requirement is a form 
of indirect coercion, and to suggest third party transportation is a solution fails to appreciate the role 
self sufficiency plays in defining the community’s religious integrity. Id., at paras. 170 and 167. 
161 [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 (S.C.C.) (creating a test to 
determine when a witness’s right to wear a head covering is constitutionally protected and when an 
accused’s rights prevail and raising access to justice implications for women from religious 
minorities). 
162 Supra, note 147 (writing, with Rowe J., to reject an inclusive conception of religion that 
was open to Aboriginal spirituality). 
163 [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) (writing separately to support the Law 
Society’s non-accreditation of TWU’s law degree, in circumstances of a mandatory religious 
covenant, to avoid condoning discriminatory practices). 
164 Supra, note 110. The motive clause defined terrorism, in part, as activity undertaken in 
whole or in part for a “political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause”. 
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only arise from a “patently incorrect understanding” of the clause.165 
Here, as well, a form of reverse methodology was at work: rather than 
imagine how the provision might chill political, religious or ideological 
expression, the Chief Justice declared that no one who read it properly 
would give the clause that interpretation. Her dismissal of concerns, in 
the face of language explicitly targeting constitutionally protected 
activity, was notably counter empathetic. 
The discussion suggests that decision-making was much as Justice 
McLachlin described it in her extra-curial commentary: an exercise in 
listening carefully, deciding each case on its own merits, and following 
her conscience to determine the right answer in every instance. Her 
process was informed by a decisional presumption in favour of the rule 
of law and some tendency toward a formalist’s view of principle. At the 
same time, that presumption was offset by conscious objectivity, which 
served as the judge’s way of seeking and finding justice and humanity 
within the rule of law’s template. Still, it ought not be assumed that this 
dialectic was binary, posing a stark choice between two choices because, 
importantly, the rule of law and the empathetic imagination could work 
in tandem. While Justice McLachlin’s decisions on fundamental justice 
stand at this intersection, two others show how she enlarged the rule of 
law to modernize and legitimize the law’s authority.  
VIII. DIALECTICAL COMPLEMENTS 
It is indubitably recognized that the section 7 trilogy of PHS 
Community Services; Bedford and Carter mark the apex of Justice 
McLachlin’s tenure as Chief Justice.166 Much has and will be written of 
the transformative power of these decisions and how they defined her 
and the work of her Court. For present purposes, their importance is in 
providing a glimpse of what the truth — her truth in judging — looked 
like to her. 
The fundamental justice trilogy is distinctive because the rule of law’s 
disapproval of arbitrary measures was in harmony with conscious 
objectivity’s search for decision-making values of caring and humanity. 
The breakthrough was PHS, with Rodriguez and Chaoulli serving as its 
                                                                                                                       
165 Id., at para. 82 (emphasis added) and 81 (stating, as well, that any chill in religious and 
ideological expression flowed from the 9/11 climate of suspicion, and not from the legislation). 
166 PHS, supra, note 26; Bedford, supra, note 5; Carter, supra, note 5. 
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forerunners.167 Whereas Rodriguez was a dissent and Chaoulli a plurality 
opinion, PHS was a unanimous majority opinion, and was followed by 
Bedford, another unanimous majority opinion. Carter was not written in 
the Chief Justice’s name but was grounded in and inspired by her 
decisions in Rodriguez, Chaoulli, PHS and Bedford. 
The Rodriguez dissent was a turning point for Beverley McLachlin, 
personally and as a jurist. It is notable for the doctrinal link she drew 
between Morgentaler’s concept of manifest unfairness and arbitrariness 
under section 7’s principles of fundamental justice. Moreover, as a matter 
of decision-making methodology, she integrated the elements of her 
doctrinal and empathetic imaginations, expressing — with evident 
emotion — her deep disapproval of a law that scapegoated Sue 
Rodriguez by forcing her to bear the burden that others might be 
improperly swayed to commit suicide.168 This dissent was an 
unquestionable call to conscience and an early hallmark of Justice 
McLachlin’s concept of conscious objectivity.  
More than 10 years later, Chaoulli was only a little less remarkable. 
The decision was brave and unexpected because the plurality opinion by 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Major J. challenged an iconic and 
seemingly untouchable health care system. Few predicted the outcome, 
which found that a provincial prohibition on private health insurance 
violated the Charter because members of the public were prevented from 
taking steps to protect their own health.169 Quite simply, prohibiting 
private insurance to protect a monopoly that could not deliver timely 
health care services was arbitrary.170 The McLachlin-Major plurality 
accepted that health care is a core prerogative of democratic governance 
but could not countenance an arbitrary interference with section 7’s 
primal guarantee of security of the person. The point again is to pause 
and observe the intersection of section 7’s doctrinal imagination and the 
empathetic imagination’s solicitude for meaningful access to health care 
services. 
Justice McLachlin dissented in Rodriguez and wrote a plurality 
opinion in Chaoulli before writing unanimous opinions in PHS and 
Bedford, both which led to the Court’s decision in Carter. It is accepted 
                                                                                                                       
167 Rodriguez, supra, note 5; Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 
2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. 
168 Rodriguez, id., at 621. 
169 Justice Deschamps wrote separate reasons concurring in the result but grounded her 
decision in the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q., C-12 [now CQLR, c. C-12]. 
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336 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
that the magnitude of the PHS-Bedford-Carter trilogy cannot easily be 
overstated. Each is a socially transformative icon of fundamental justice 
under section 7, and in each the Court assumed the authority to act as an 
agent of change. PHS, Bedford and Carter are also an exercise in 
doctrinal and empathetic imagination: the evolution and synthesis of 
section 7’s principles of fundamental justice coincided with the demands 
of empathy for marginalized drug users, sex trade workers, and those 
suffering but prohibited from making a choice to end their life. Of the 
three, PHS stands out as the breakthrough, the decision that forged a vital 
and unforgettable connection between rule of law and empathy’s concern 
for at risk and marginalized populations.  
The issue in PHS was whether the federal government violated the 
Charter by refusing to exempt the Downtown Eastside’s safe injection 
sites from federal drug laws. Finding a violation and ordering mandamus 
against the government required a careful and somewhat novel analysis. 
What should not be overlooked is the structure and sensibility of the 
Chief Justice’s majority opinion. It is difficult not to be struck and even 
moved by the care she took to establish the factual framework for the 
Downtown Eastside’s safe injection sites (“DTES”). Her account of the 
DTES — its population, its sheer vulnerability and the realities of drug 
addiction — were the backdrop and key to her conclusion that to refuse 
an exemption, in the circumstances, was an arbitrary departure from the 
public health objectives of the site and violation of the Charter.171  
Bedford was extraordinary for many reasons, not least of which was 
that it was a unanimous decision of the Court. From any perspective, that 
must be considered a remarkable feat for the Chief Justice. It is 
especially interesting, in light of her dissent in Downey, that she so 
effectively joined the two elements of her internal dialectic and 
persuaded all members of the Court to sign the opinion. Though much of 
the commentary has trained its attention on her synthesis of section 7’s 
principles of fundamental justice, the context was again of central 
importance. Vitally, she linked the lived experiences of sex trade workers 
to the harms they were exposed to by arbitrary laws. She synthesized 
section 7’s key principles of fundamental justice for the first time and, in 
doing so, repeatedly emphasized the criminal law’s egregious impact on 
sex trade workers engaged in the legal practice of prostitution.172  
                                                                                                                       
171 PHS, supra, note 26, at paras. 4-20. 
172 Bedford, supra, note 5, at paras. 3-14 (outlining the applicants’ circumstances). 
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Finally, Carter was an unsigned opinion of the Court but 
unmistakably vindicated the Rodriguez dissent and did so from the 
vantage of agreement by the full Court. This decision marked the high 
point of the Chief Justice’s dialectical journey, fusing her doctrinal and 
empathetic imaginations in a triumph of judicial conscience that was 
likely more meaningful to her because of its endorsement by “the Court”. 
These fundamental justice decisions both stand apart from and yet 
ground the narrative of Justice McLachlin’s dialectical journey. Together 
they represent the defining moments — the magic moments — in her 
legacy. 
IX. THE RULE OF LAW AS MODERN SHAMAN 
Justice McLachlin’s loyalty was to the law and her duty to protect its 
authority, and she believed that to preserve its legitimacy the law must be 
available, responsive and relevant to all members of the community. She 
enlarged her rule of law to incorporate values of democratic 
participation, transparency, and access to justice, as well as to 
accommodate the demands of “practicality, flexibility, and individual 
justice”.173  
It can be forgotten, for instance, that Sauvé v. Canada (Chief 
Electoral Officer), was fundamentally a rule of law decision.174 That is 
significant because Sauvé 2002 was a “second look” decision and when 
the question of disfranchising prisoners returned, the Court divided by a 
5-4 margin.175 To explain why denying prisoners the right to vote 
violated the Charter the Chief Justice’s majority opinion looked to the 
rule of law. She openly appealed to a modern conception of the rule, 
stating that the government’s exclusionary policy “undermines the 
legitimacy of government, the effectiveness of government, and the rule 
of law”, impermissibly countermanding the message that “everyone is 
equally worthy and entitled to respect under the law”.176 In her 
estimation, disfranchising prisoners was “more likely to erode respect 
for the rule of law than to enhance it”.177 The Chief Justice’s claim that 
democratic participation would motivate prisoners to respect the law 
                                                                                                                       
173 “Rules and Discretion”, supra, note 40. 
174 [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé 
2002”]. 
175 Sauvé v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 59, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 (S.C.C.). 
176 Sauvé 2002, supra, note 174, at para. 58. 
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was intimately linked to her enduring focus on legitimacy as the 
cornerstone of law’s authority.178  
As discussed above, the vitality of the justice system was a central 
piece in her conception of the rule of law.  Justice McLachlin emphasized 
public access to the Court’s work as the linchpin of confidence in the 
judiciary, the law’s authority, and the rule of law.179 As a jurist, she 
supported the open court principle, stating on one occasion that it lies “at 
the heart of the rule of law”.180 She valued access to justice, maintaining 
in 1994 that the justice system must be accessible to adjudicate claims 
that the Charter has been violated.181 Nor should it be overlooked that her 
support for damages under section 24(1) of the Charter is closely related 
to these themes.182 Still, her rule of law could also work in a different 
direction, as R. v. Hall demonstrates.183  
What stands out finally, though, is the Chief Justice’s majority reasons 
in Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General).184 There, she read access to justice into section 96 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867,185 to support her conclusion that hearing fees 
that impose undue hardship on litigants are unconstitutional. Her rationale  
 
                                                                                                                       
178 Id., at para. 38 (emphasizing that depriving “at-risk” individuals of their “sense of 
collective identity and membership in the community” is “unlikely to instill a sense of responsibility 
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179 See, e.g., Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “Courts, Transparency and Public 
Confidence – To the Better Administration of Justice” (2003) 8 Deakin L. Rev. 1, at 9 (stating, in 
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existence of the rule of law and a cornerstone of democratic civil society”). 
180 “Openness and the Rule of Law”, supra, note 40, at 24. 
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182 Vancouver (City) v. Ward, [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 
(S.C.C.); Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 24, 2015 SCC 24, [2015] 
2 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion); Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, [2017] S.C.J. No. 1, 
2017 SCC 1, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion).  
183 [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, at para. 27 (S.C.C.) (upholding a second look 
bail provision that authorized the denial of bail to maintain confidence in the administration of 
justice, because “public confidence and the integrity of the rule of law are inextricably intertwined”). 
184 Supra, note 25. 
185 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
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invoked the rule of law, explaining that the threat was not abstract or 
theoretical but real. If government action could not be challenged in court, 
the state would be seen as above the law; without access to courts, the 
creation and maintenance of positive laws would be hampered; and the 
division of responsibility between legislatures and courts would be 
skewed.186 Her innovative and even radical use of the rule of law to ground 
a claim under section 96 did not go unchallenged.187  
Trial Lawyers points up the malleability of her concept, showing how far 
the rule of law had come from its more conventional iterations elsewhere in 
her jurisprudence. Moreover, like Sauvé, Trial Lawyers demonstrated the 
interface between the rule of law and the role of humanity in reasoned legal 
conscience. As she put it, the fee scheme was “arguably an affront to dignity 
and imposes a significant burden on the potential litigant of adducing proof 
of impoverishment”.188 Sauvé and Trial Lawyers are distinctive, if not 
singular, for the way they inflected the rule of law with modern content and 
in doing so reflected the common bond that links the legitimacy of the law 
with its capacity for justice and humanity.189 
X. WHERE THE OBSERVERS STAND190 
Canada is not much in the habit of comparing and pronouncing on the 
greatness of its Supreme Court judges, as occurs in the United States. Yet 
when the measure of a judicial life is taken, instinct gravitates toward the 
jurists who are singled out as the mavericks, champions, intellects, and 
characters of Supreme Court history. Beverley McLachlin’s legacy does not 
conform to type and cannot be reduced to one word or to any easy 
characterization. As once stated, “where she sits” may depend on “where the 
observers stand”.191 In other words, how she is regarded might be a function 
of what an observer chooses to see, whether it be liberalism or conservatism; 
activism or restraint; the rule of law or conscious objectivity. By her own 
                                                                                                                       
186 Supra, note 184, at para. 40. 
187 While Cromwell J. wrote concurring reasons ducking the constitutional issue, Rothstein 
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admission she never set her sights too high, aiming only to be remembered 
as a “competent” or a “good” jurist. Though it is stunningly obvious that 
Beverley McLachlin vastly over-achieved that goal, there is a risk of her 
diffidence or self-effacement influencing, or even defining, her legacy. 
Though an unparalleled judge at the Court, she remained something 
of an enigma throughout. What emerges from this study is the profile of 
a judge who was methodically and fastidiously analytical, determined to 
make the law legitimate by keeping it “simple, clean and relevant”, and 
mindful all the while that the law serves values of justice and humanity. 
The one cause Justice McLachlin served was the law. In that service she 
guarded her independence to decide each case on its own, by her lights 
and no one else’s. As this study attests, she guarded this independence 
above all else. On reflection, it is a testament to her judicial conscience — 
and will — that she could dispassionately address each case on its own 
merits, seeking the one answer that would achieve singular justice in that 
instance. Her methodology of justice in the small nonetheless generated a 
jurisprudence that includes breakthrough decisions and unforgettable 
moments. All that said, the McLachlin legacy consists more truly in her 
decision-making than in the decisions she made. 
There is considerable scholarly debate and discussion of the follies 
around judicial biography and the related field of legacy scholarship. In 
light of her unremitting humility, hagiography may be less a concern for 
Beverley McLachlin, as she has done as much as she could to discourage 
it. But the temptation to build a narrative that makes a story is another 
issue that surfaces in the genre. In the search for essentials there may be 
such a thing as “imposing too much coherence on the story”.192  
There are many ways to lead, to make a difference, and to exercise the 
formidable powers of a Supreme Court judge. One of those ways is to 
serve truly and in truth to one’s humility and integrity. From that 
perspective, imposing a sense of order on Beverley McLachlin’s 
jurisprudence does not take the measure of this judge. Somewhat artificial 
and even a disservice to her, this approach misses the mark. The best 
answers she found to complex issues over 28 years do not conform to a 
singular conception of rights, of the Charter, or of justice. The measure of 
this judge is as simple as it is grand: it consists in her sensibility of office 
and integrity in holding herself accountable, in every case, to her own 
conception — grounded in methodology — of judicial conscience. 
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